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ABSTRACT
Failure to consider the cultural and social factors of projects can lead to situations where 
mitigation does not effectively address the impacts they were intended to alleviate, and can 
even create other impacts. We critically analyse the processes of designing and implementing 
a social and environmental compensation program for the Lajeado Hydroelectric Dam in the 
Amazon region of central-northern Brazil. This mitigation program caused a wide range of social 
and environmental impacts on the Xerente Indigenous people, such as intra-group conflict, 
and changes in agricultural practices and food regime. Based on qualitative fieldwork and an 
extensive document analysis, we present a contextualization of the region, the project, the 
Xerente people, and their cosmological understandings. We consider the perspectives of a broad 
range of stakeholders about the compensation program and its outcomes, and demonstrate 
how traditional cultural practices and values played a role in the unfolding of the program. Better 
comprehension of sociocultural aspects through the use of ethnography, ongoing consultation, 
and meaningful community participation in the planning and implementation of mitigation 
measures are recommended.
1. Introduction
We argue that to fully comprehend the environmental 
and social impacts of projects in cross-cultural con-
texts, it is essential to include ethnographic fieldwork 
as a component of the social impact assessment (SIA), 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and other stud-
ies. Despite the warning of Ballard and Banks (2003, p. 
289) that ‘mining is no ethnographic playground’ (due 
to complexity of the stakeholder interactions and strate-
gies), we demonstrate that ethnographic data can foster 
better cultural understanding among impact assessment 
and social performance practitioners, especially those 
responsible for developing and implementing the mit-
igation measures and compensation arrangements 
(Roper 1983; Chase 1990; Stoffle et al. 1991; Thanner & 
Segal 2008). Without proper consideration of the local 
cultural context, even well-intentioned mitigation meas-
ures can ultimately create unintended impacts (Vanclay 
2002; 2012). In current practice around the world, most 
SIAs that consider impacts on Indigenous people are 
usually ‘ethnographically thin,’ thus limiting their capac-
ity to properly promote culturally adequate and effective 
mitigation measures (Westman 2013).
In order to advance the proposition that ethnographic 
fieldwork is essential, we examine a specific case that 
of the compensation plan developed to mitigate the 
impacts of the Lajeado Hydroelectric Dam in the Brazilian 
Amazon region. The Lajeado Hydroelectric Dam, which 
is officially called the Luis Eduardo Magalhães Dam 
(Lajeado for convenience), was constructed in the state 
of Tocantins in central-north Brazil between 1996 and 
2001. With a reservoir area of 630 square kilometers, 
the powerplant has an installed capacity of around 
900 MW (Engetec 2015). Following an EIA completed 
in 1996, a compensation program called Programa de 
Compensação Ambiental Xerente (PROCAMBIX) was 
designed in 2000 to mitigate the social and environmen-
tal impacts of the dam on the 3000 Xerente Indigenous 
people, who are located a few kilometers downstream. 
The history of contact between the Xerente (who are 
also known as Akwĕ) and the ‘neobrazilians’ (as Curt 
Nimuendajú refers to non-Indigenous Brazilians) is 
marked by violence and land struggle with missionaries, 
gold seekers, and settlers (Nimuendajú 1942; de Paula 
2000).
Considered to be the first private dam in Brazil, Lajeado 
was part of a broader government strategy that focused 
on bringing development to the then recently created 
Tocantins state and its capital city, Palmas. Due to its stra-
tegic location in the center of Brazil, the discourse about 
‘development and modernization’ was very dominant in 
its formation (Zitzke 2007) and remains strongly present 
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Arguably, the primary objectives of EIA and SIA are 
to identify possible impacts and propose mitigation and 
enhancement measures (João et al. 2011; Esteves et al. 
2012; Morgan 2012). To fully achieve these objectives 
and to improve the overall quality and effectiveness 
of future interventions, follow-up evaluation of EIAs, 
SIAs and mitigation, and compensation measures are 
necessary (Marshall et al. 2005). To fully understand the 
perspectives of impacted groups, we argue that ethno-
graphical fieldwork is necessary, especially in culturally 
diverse situations. In order to demonstrate this, we dis-
cuss the follow-up evaluation of PROCAMBIX and con-
sider the varying perceptions of the impacts, program 
design, and efficacy of the mitigation measures that 
were deployed. Recommendations for improving the 
outcomes of similar projects are provided.
2. Methodology
This paper utilizes fieldwork conducted by the pri-
mary author over a two-week period in May 2014 in 
the Brazilian municipalities of Palmas, Tocantínia, and 
Miracema do Tocantíns. Figure 1 is a Google Earth image 
of the general location showing the large long lake cre-
ated by the dam and two Indigenous territories, Funil 
and Xerente, both of which are inhabited by the Xerente 
people.
today (Parente 2015). This development trajectory has 
fueled conflicts between Indigenous and non-Indige-
nous communities, with the Indigenous peoples being 
perceived as obstacles to the economic development of 
the state (Menestrino & Parente 2011).
To analyse the performance of the PROCAMBIX com-
pensation program, we give particular attention to 
Indigenous perceptions of the impacts of the dam and 
the mitigation measures. This is supported by a descrip-
tion of the broader socio-political context in which the 
compensation project was designed and implemented 
– aspects that are not usually considered in impact 
assessment (O’Faircheallaigh 2011; Baines et al. 2013). 
This paper considers both the social and environmental 
impacts because, especially in an Indigenous context, 
they are highly integrated (Slootweg et al. 2001; Vanclay 
2002). Careful consideration is given to the cultural and 
socio-political aspects that can play a role in project 
development, such as native cosmological concepts and 
inter-ethnic relations (Westman 2013). These aspects are 
important to better comprehend the efficacy of the miti-
gation measures and to provide a fuller understanding of 
social impacts, especially when traditional communities 
are involved. Traditional communities are not necessarily 
Indigenous, but nevertheless are culturally different from 
the broader society, and have a special connection to 
their land and territories (Hanna et al. 2014).
Figure 1. the lajeado dam and the neighboring Indigenous lands.
308  P. HANNA ET AL.
In order to understand the perspectives of those 
who were involved in PROCAMBIX, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with key informants cov-
ering a wide range of stakeholder groups. The people 
interviewed included: representatives of community 
associations; Indigenous elders; staff from the state 
government environmental agency (Naturantins); 
one of the solicitors from the Federal Office of Public 
Prosecution (Ministério Público Federal [MPF]) responsi-
ble for mediating the agreement between the propo-
nent and impacted communities; staff from the NGO 
Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI), an important 
Catholic NGO defending Indigenous issues; academ-
ics from the Anthropology Department of the State 
University of Tocantins; and staff from the National 
Indigenous Agency (FUNAI).
A total of 15 interviews were conducted by the pri-
mary author, a native Brazilian. Key informants were iden-
tified using a snowball technique. Where permission was 
granted, which was in about half the cases, interviews 
were recorded and transcribed, while in other cases 
extensive handwritten notes were taken. In addition to 
the formal interviews, a range of other social research 
techniques typically applied in fieldwork settings were 
used, including participation observation, field notes and 
diarising. The qualitative data analysis software pack-
age, Atlas-Ti, was used to assist in the analysis. Topics 
discussed in each interview related to: the impacts of 
the dam; the negotiation process for the compensation 
program; implementation of the program; the interview-
ee’s personal assessment of the positive and negative 
aspects of the program; and their views about mistakes 
made and what could have been done better. The com-
pany, INVESTCO, which was responsible for building the 
dam and implementing the program, was contacted 
several times, but was unavailable for an interview. The 
social research principles of respect for participants and 
informed consent (Vanclay et al. 2013) were observed 
throughout the whole research process, and all partici-
pants were aware of the nature of our research.
We are aware that the limitations of our methodology 
do not allow a comprehensive study of the Xerente peo-
ple or a full analysis of the Lajeado Dam. Nevertheless, 
we feel that we have an adequate basis by which to make 
the statements we do. This is not a full ethnographic 
study, which would have required deep immersion and 
a longer time period than was available. While this was 
originally intended, the complexities of conducting 
ethnographic fieldwork about a program that was con-
cluded over 10  years ago made this impossible. Also, 
during the time of the fieldwork, an investigation into 
alleged corruption with PROCAMBIX was underway mak-
ing some informants reluctant to speak, at least about 
certain topics. Nevertheless, appropriate key informants 
from almost all relevant stakeholder groups agreed to be 
interviewed. To counter the limitations in the fieldwork, 
we have triangulated as much as possible, especially by 
undertaking an extensive document analysis, including 
of all project-related documents and anthropological 
literature about the Xerente and Jê peoples.
3. The dam, the licensing process and the 
compensation plan
A timeline of events is given in Figure 2. Following sev-
eral assessments of the hydroelectric potential of the 
Tocantins River since the 1960s, discussions on the 
construction of a dam were initiated in earnest in the 
early 1990s. An EIA commissioned by the electricity com-
pany, CELTINS, was completed in 1996 (THEMAG 1996). 
Following the requirements of the Brazilian environmen-
tal licensing procedure (see Hanna et al. 2014), an item 
called ‘Indigenous Issues’ was included in the socioec-
onomic chapter of the EIA report. This focused almost 
exclusively on the history of the Xerente people and 
their relations with the non-Indigenous society, and no 
social impacts from the dam were detailed other than the 
generic impact of development pressure on Indigenous 
territory. In 1997, an open tender to construct the dam 
was advertised, with the winning and only bid being 
INVESTCO, an ad hoc consortium that comprised Grupo 
Rede, Companhia Energética de Brasília (CEB), and the 
multinational Energias de Portugal (EDP). INVESTCO was 
established as consortium specifically to build and man-
age the Lajeado dam (Araújo 2003).
The licensing process for the dam was controver-
sial, and led to many protest actions from the different 
interest groups (Araújo 2003; Zitzke 2007). It was initially 
alleged by INVESTCO that, because the Indigenous com-
munities were located downstream, there was no need 
to do impact studies relating to the Indigenous peoples. 
It was stated by several interviewees that it was generally 
accepted that downstream communities would not be 
affected by a dam, and that it was common practice for 
EIA studies not to consider downstream communities. 
Cernea (1997) has also stated that downstream impacts 
are usually understated and ill-considered by dam pro-
ponents and in impact assessments. The compensation 
plan, PROCAMBIX, only arose in 2001 as a result of pres-
sure over several years from civil society in relation to 
the lack of interest by INVESTCO in addressing the social 
impacts on the Xerente people.
Because of concern about the dam, a group of civil 
society organizations got together and organized the 
so-called ‘First Seminar on the Lajeado Dam,’ which was 
held in October 1998. It was attended by NGOs, uni-
versity staff, representatives of the movement of dam- 
affected people (MAB), trade unions, the proponent, 
and the state level licensing authority (Naturantins). The 
seminar was considered by some interviewees as being 
historically significant in that it led to acknowledgment 
of the existence of social impacts from the dam. CIMI had 
a major role in facilitating the participation of Indigenous 
leaders who spoke about the potential impacts on their 
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livelihoods. After the seminar, which had been very suc-
cessful in influencing local public opinion about the likely 
impacts of the dam, the competent authorities (IBAMA, 
Naturantins, FUNAI) started to pressure INVESTCO to 
acknowledge the social and environmental impacts on 
the Xerente people and to design mitigation measures. 
According to our interviews and the literature available 
(Araújo 2003; Zitzke 2007), it was only due to the subse-
quent widespread social protest that the social issues 
were eventually considered.
In 1999, INVESTCO commissioned the Federal 
University of Mato Grosso and the NGO Operação 
Amazônia Nativa (OPAN) to identify a set of actions to 
mitigate the impacts of the dam on the Xerente people 
(OPAN-GERA 2000). Their multidisciplinary report pro-
posed the establishment of a Xerente Environmental 
Management Program, which would focus on three 
broad themes: (1) Territory and Natural Resources; (2) 
Food Security and Income Generation (i.e. livelihood); 
and (3) Culture and Citizenship. They recommended 
Indigenous participation in the development, execu-
tion, and monitoring of the program as a fundamental 
principle. A related recommendation was to establish 
a Management Council comprising the licensing insti-
tutions, INVESTCO, and representatives chosen by the 
Xerente. This study became informally known as ‘the 
Mother Project’ and later became the basis for formal-
izing an agreement about a compensation program 
between the proponent, the licensing institutions, and 
the Xerente.
After completion of the report in May 2000, there was 
much negotiation about the terms of the agreement. 
Lack of interest by the proponent and licensing institu-
tions in concluding this discussion led to much concern 
by the Xerente. After various protest actions – including 
the detaining of company and government staff for sev-
eral hours by a group of Indigenous activists (Agência 
Estado 2001) – the concerns of the Xerente started to 
be taken more seriously. According to one of our key 
Indigenous informants, it was only after the detention 
that FUNAI became fully involved in the process. The 
conflict led to intervention by the Federal Office of 
Public Prosecution, which in 2002 negotiated a Terms of 
Adjustment of Conduct with the parties for establishing 
the Xerente Program for Environmental Compensation 
(PROCAMBIX). Although the mother project originally 
recommended a budget of R$14 million for the com-
pensation and mitigation activities, after a tough nego-
tiation process, the program that was eventually agreed 
and implemented had a budget of only R$10 million. In 
2001, this would have been roughly equivalent to US$5 
million.
The PROCAMBIX projects that were ultimately imple-
mented were largely based around the three sub-themes 
defined in the mother project and were implemented 
over eight years, from 2002 to 2009 (Cordeiro 2009). The 
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government procurement system, which was considered 
to be bureaucratic and inefficient. Requisites had to be 
procured from the cheapest supplier, without consid-
eration as to where in Brazil they were located or how 
long delivery would take. One interviewee related the 
case of an agricultural project where seeds were needed 
at a critical time for sowing in order to secure a good 
harvest. However, due to delays in the transfer of funds 
and the transaction process to purchase the seeds, the 
optimal planting time had already passed before they 
arrived. Another interviewee described the purchase of 
chickens from a supplier over 2000 km away in Southern 
Brazil. Since the chickens were not used to the warmer 
climate of Tocantins, many perished soon after arrival. 
Furthermore, as industrially bred chickens they had been 
de-beaked. Totally dependent upon commercial chicken 
feed, they could not scavenge for their own food. This 
resulted in extra costs and greater management effort in 
obtaining the feed and an increased workload in feeding 
them. These examples demonstrate how the compensa-
tion resources were wasted due to bureaucratic delays 
and inadequacies involved in the implementation of 
PROCAMBIX.
Many non-Indigenous people were contracted as 
consultants and paid out of the fund, providing a range 
of services such as technical support and general admin-
istration. An older Xerente described these non-Indig-
enous actors as being like ‘jaguars preying on game’ 
and noted that as soon as the feast was over [i.e. the 
funds for the compensation program were exhausted], 
the ‘white jaguars’ upped and left. Similarly, a Xerente 
(de Paula 2003, 2005) suggested that the program was 
perceived as a ‘big fat tapir’ to be feasted upon. In 2010 
after the program had ceased, the Xerente attempted a 
class action suit to claim further compensation for the 
impacts of the on-going operation of the dam. There was 
a lengthy court case, with a judge deciding in 2013 that 
INVESTCO had fulfilled all its obligations and that the 
Xerente were not entitled to further compensation (Ação 
Civil Pública 2013).
4. Creation myths and political factions
The Xerente people are part of the broader Jê ethnic 
group. As with all Indigenous groups, mythology plays a 
key role in understanding the current order of the world. 
The jaguar, for example, is present in the Jê myth about 
how humans acquired fire. In the beginning, only the 
jaguar possessed fire and would not share it. In order to 
cook and to have warmth, the Xerente needed to capture 
fire from the jaguar. They eventually tricked the jaguar 
and were able to gain possession of fire. For being greedy 
and not sharing, the jaguar was punished and forever 
after could only eat raw meat (Mindlin 2002). This myth 
positions the jaguar as an important symbol to describe 
greedy people, but it also justifies the right of the Xerente 
to take things denied them in critical situations.
actions focusing on ecological zoning and environmental 
education. Food Security and Income Generation imple-
mented many strategies, including the stimulation of 
alternative livelihoods such as the raising of chickens and 
cattle, fish farming, fruit orchards, honey production, and 
the provision of tractors to mechanize agriculture. Culture 
and Citizenship focused on strengthening Xerente cul-
ture and social organization through the construction of 
a cultural center and promotion of traditional activities. 
An Administrative and Technical Support component was 
added for managing the program. In order to implement 
the program, a steering committee comprising six non- 
Indigenous and six Indigenous representatives was estab-
lished. The non-Indigenous representatives were from 
INVESTCO, IBAMA, FUNAI, the Office of Public Prosecution, 
Naturantins, and the Secretary of Citizenship and Justice 
of Tocantins State. According to our interviews, CIMI was 
‘excluded’ from the process due to its critical stance, such 
as being against the use of compensation funds to pay 
for education and health, considered by CIMI as a govern-
ment obligation and not a mitigation action.
The implementation of PROCAMBIX was marked by 
several logistic difficulties in the acquisition of materi-
als and the transfer of resources between the various 
institutions. Money was transferred twice a year from 
INVESTCO to the steering committee. However, for 
various reasons that are unclear, these payments were 
made via FUNAI, leading to delays in the funding being 
available to the projects. A new association, Associação 
Indígena Akwĕ (AIA), was created to manage the applica-
tion of the funds, undercutting the power and resources 
of the existing association, Associação Indígena Xerente 
(AIX), which created resentment and hostility between 
the factions.
A mid-term evaluation report (de Paula 2003) was 
commissioned. Despite being a very good analysis of 
many of the issues that were beginning to emerge with 
PROCAMBIX, its recommendations were largely ignored 
by the Steering Committee and there was little mem-
ory of that report at the time of the fieldwork for this 
research. Perhaps the most important concerns were 
that there was inadequate financial monitoring and a 
high potential for improper conduct. A substantial final 
evaluation (Cordeiro 2009) commissioned by the German 
Agency for International Development (GIZ, then GTZ) 
was completed in 2009, largely raising the same issues 
as the midterm evaluation. In contrast to the midterm 
evaluation, however, there was considerable awareness 
of the final evaluation and it was frequently mentioned 
in our interviews. All people we interviewed who men-
tioned the report spoke very highly of it, and considered 
that it was a fair description of what had happened with 
the implementation of PROCAMBIX. These evaluations 
have informed our analysis, and are considered in detail 
further below in our paper.
Our interviewees told us that the materials needed 
for the program had to be purchased through the 
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The Xerente people are very worried. Are the Xerente 
people ready to receive progress? Many people will 
move because they can’t stand [the changes]. We have 
been talking with 30 chiefs in Serra da Mesa [where 
another dam has been built], and what we saw was 
dirty tricks. We do not want band-aid solutions (remed-
inho), we want things that help us guarantee that what 
is now on paper [referring to a range of promises by 
INVESTCO] is really going to be fulfilled. Today we are 
left in the bushes like animals. We need the authorities 
on our side, because not only the Indigenous but also 
many whites will suffer the impacts of this construc-
tion. (Seminário 1998, p. 37 – author translation)
Similar concerns were also expressed by Chief Domingos:
We know that there might be an increase in prosti-
tution, alcoholism, the arrival of new diseases, and 
the invasion of Xerente lands due to our proximity to 
the construction site. (Seminário 1998, p. 38 – author 
translation)
Although, Brazil only became a signatory to ILO 
Convention 169 (on Indigenous peoples) in 2002 –estab-
lishing the state obligation to consult Indigenous peo-
ples when their lives are affected by administrative or 
legislative actions and conferring on them the right to 
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) (Hanna & Vanclay 
2013) – there had been a strong debate about Indigenous 
rights in Brazil since around the Altamira gathering in 
February 1989. The Altamira gathering was the first 
major mobilization of Indigenous peoples in Brazil, and 
occurred as a form of protest against the building of a 
large dam (which is now called the Belo Monte Dam) in 
the Amazon region (Turner 1993; Fearnside 2006). The 
topics covered in this national debate on Indigenous 
rights are reflected in Chief Ranulfo’s criticism of the 
consultation process for the Lajeado Dam, and his com-
parison of its development with a predatory jaguar:
We Xerente are suffering for a long time, and only 
those of us who are chiefs and leaders in our commu-
nities know about our suffering. This [development] 
looks like a jaguar that wants to devour everything, 
not only the Indigenous, but also the white [people]. 
This progress will bring people we don’t know close to 
us. Which chiefs were consulted? In our Reserve there 
are 30 chiefs and only 4 were consulted. The agencies 
responsible for monitoring need to be aware of this. 
We are here now, looking in each other’s eyes, trying to 
find a way to get out of the jaguar’s mouth. (Seminário 
1998, p. 38 – author translation)
Among the first impacts of the dam to be mentioned 
in most of our interviews were the decline in fish stocks 
and episodes of fish-kill. Prior to the dam, fish were the 
primary source of protein for the Xerente, and could be 
easily caught in the Tocantins River or obtained through 
traditional food sharing networks (Schmidt 2011). A sim-
ilar impact happened to bushfoods. Due to increasing 
development pressure on the Indigenous territories, 
game became scarcer. The Xerente ascribe this to the 
loss of habitat and to the influx of non-Indigenous 
workers during dam construction. In addition to urban 
expansion and associated impacts (e.g. noise, roads, etc.), 
In general, Jê peoples share some common charac-
teristics, one of which is a complex kinship system based 
on clan moieties (Maybury-Lewis 1989). The Xerente cre-
ation myth is based on the duality between the mythic 
heroes embedded in the sun and the moon, and is repre-
sented in the division between the exogamous moieties. 
The sun moiety is called Doí and the moon Wahirê, which, 
depending on the academic source, are each composed 
of three or four clans (Oliveira Reis 2001).
These clans are very important political groupings, 
governing many aspects of life. For example, accord-
ing to the prescriptions around marriage, members of 
one moiety should only marry members from the other 
moiety. Although these marriage rules are not fully prac-
ticed nowadays (Oliveira Reis 2001), in everyday life, 
especially in politics, moieties still play a strong role and 
create a stage for significant factionalism (de Paula 2000; 
Fernandes 2012). The factions result in varying political 
alliances, be they among themselves, or with non-Indig-
enous political actors from the region and occasionally 
with national and international allies. Leaders need to act 
as political strategists in order to access resources avail-
able through the various government programs. They 
must transit between multiple and different worlds – 
among the many local Indigenous communities, and the 
many non-Indigenous political spaces (de Paula 2000).
An interesting ritual is ‘the great fast,’ which was prac-
ticed by the Xerente to avoid having severe droughts. 
Nimuendajú (1942) wonders why this ritual would arise 
in the fertile and water-rich land the Xerente currently 
occupy. He speculates that the Xerente may have pre-
viously inhabited much drier lands closer to the São 
Francisco River region, where the ritual would likely 
have been meaningful. They took this ritual with them 
when they relocated hundreds of years ago and contin-
ued to practice it in their new environment where most 
agriculture was based on seasonal river flooding. This 
ritual reveals the cultural value of the seasonal flood-
ing to the Xerente people and their livelihoods, and the 
direct relation between cosmology and their environ-
ment. The completion of the Lajeado Dam stopped the 
annual flooding and has led to the decline in fertility 
of downstream riverside land. Besides impacts on the 
Xerente cosmological order, the dam has also impeded 
the continuation of their traditional agricultural tech-
niques based around the annual river flooding.
5. The sociocultural impacts of the dam and 
compensation program
As discussed earlier, the licensing and impact assess-
ment processes for the dam were controversial and 
were marked by protests and distrust from the impacted 
communities. The concerns of the Xerente people were 
clearly expressed by Xerente Chief Isaac in his address to 
the First Seminar in 1998:
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now also used for a range of other purposes; and (3) the 
few head of cattle provided to each family through one 
of the last projects of PROCAMBIX.
According to the interviewees, the failure of the liveli-
hood projects could be attributed to inadequate techni-
cal support. Where there was support from agronomists 
or other technicians, projects were typically abandoned 
or failed after they left. Unfortunately, in most situations 
there was inadequate capacity building to enable the 
Xerente to continue these projects autonomously, inde-
pendent of the technical support. Another reason given 
for the failure of some projects was the inadequacy of 
the engagement processes about what local households 
wanted to produce. For example, chicken coops were 
provided to every family in an attempt to have a fair 
distribution of benefits, however not every family was 
willing to raise chickens. Furthermore, chicken and eggs 
are not part of the Xerente culture or their traditional 
diet. People said that there were times when there was 
an excess of eggs, with many people tired of eating them, 
and no mechanism for their sale.
The lack of representation of all clans on the 
PROCAMBIX steering committee was another prob-
lem voiced in the interviews. Members of some clans 
considered that not all clans were equally enjoying the 
benefits of the projects, especially with regard to which 
individuals (and their clans) were employed by the pro-
gram. Because of the conflicts between the clans, one 
MPF Federal Prosecutor we interviewed conjectured that 
the PROCAMBIX program might have caused more harm 
than the dam itself. It is very clear that there is recogni-
tion that PROCAMBIX had many negative consequences, 
as one Xerente interviewee stated:
From the time PROCAMBIX emerged, it caused this 
division in the relationship and respect between the 
clans. They became divided, all because of the dam. We 
realize today that thinking about a program that will 
minimize the impacts is very complex, because it is not 
just about bringing in [mitigation] projects. It is not just 
that – it goes much further than that – the survival of ‘a 
people’ is at risk, the culture of a people, the speech, the 
language of the people, their customs, respect, belief, 
dance. Then it all ends up being affected, as it affected 
the Xerente Indigenous population.
A Xerente Chief voiced the same opinion and suggested 
that PROCAMBIX had negatively affected the public 
image and morale of the Xerente people. According 
to him, many local non-Indigenous people blamed the 
Xerente for the various failures of the program. This per-
ception by the non-Indigenous comes from their view 
that R$10 million was a lot of money, together with their 
general prejudice that Indigenous peoples are inherently 
lazy, and that therefore the failure of the projects had 
to be the fault of the Xerente, that they just didn’t work 
hard enough. The failure of the program had the effect of 
exacerbating the negative perception about the Xerente 
held by the non-Indigenous.
many workers hunted on Xerente lands. Alongside the 
increased pressure on available game, the workers used 
more efficient equipment, such as four-wheel-drive vehi-
cles with powerful spotlights for night hunting.
Another significant change relates to the traditional 
farming technique called ‘roça de toco,’ a variation in 
slash-and-burn or swidden agriculture. It was stated in 
interviews that, as a result of PROCAMBIX incentives 
to farm mechanically, this traditional practice has been 
largely discontinued. Thus, the inter-generational trans-
mission of traditional farming knowledge has been 
affected. Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, 
modes of subsistence, cosmology, and their natural 
environment are all intrinsically inter-related (Descola 
2005). Since mechanical agriculture is dependent on 
the on-going availability of cheap fuel and tractor 
parts, its implementation failed with the cessation of 
PROCAMBIX funding. The interviewees affirmed that 
there was not a return to traditional farming techniques, 
impacting negatively on their cultural reproduction and 
food security. Traditional food gathering of bush fruits 
and native honey was also affected, but not only by the 
dam. Due to the loss of native habitat for agribusiness 
expansion (especially soybeans and sugarcane) and the 
large amount of chemicals used on these monoculture 
crops, there has been a deleterious impact on native 
bee, bird, and wildlife populations, significantly affect-
ing the bushfoods eaten by the Xerente. As a result, 
there has been a significant change in their food habits 
with most food now being bought in neighboring cit-
ies, rather than produced or collected locally (Schmidt 
2011).
This change in the diet of Indigenous peoples (in 
Brazil and elsewhere) has led to a rise in obesity, diabe-
tes, hypertension, and other lifestyle diseases (Gracey & 
King 2009). The Xerente and other Jê groups share the 
conception that the non-Indigenous industrialized food 
is ‘weak’ and ‘full of poison,’ and that eating it has made 
the younger generations weaker and more susceptible 
to disease (Hanna 2009). The change in food has also 
led to a rise in the amount of garbage in the villages 
(Schmidt 2011) and a change in traditional food shar-
ing networks and consequently to a loss of community 
social capital.
When asked about their evaluation of project out-
comes, the Xerente are clear: ‘It was 10 million at the 
time, a lot of money! Today we cannot really see where 
the money has gone.’ They stated that the legacy of the 
program can only be observed by the three items that 
were still standing in 2014 (when the interviews were 
conducted): (1) the rusty tractors that are lying about, 
abandoned due to lack of resources for their mainte-
nance after the program ended; (2) a Cultural Center in 
the city of Tocantínia, which was built to keep an archive 
of materials and allow the Xerente to have a facility for 
their internal and external administrative affairs, and is 
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6. Discussion
The final evaluation report prepared for the German 
Agency for International Development (GIZ) highlighted 
many of the issues with PROCAMBIX as discussed above:
a series of conditions influenced the performance of 
the program … the resizing of the original proposal 
due to the lower values approved in the agreement; 
slowness in the processing of administrative proce-
dures; staff turnover in technical departments; the time 
required for the management of the conflicts of inter-
est inside the Indigenous community; interruption of 
activities for diverse reasons; complex institutional 
arrangements with implications to the financial man-
agement; an increase in the number of villages during 
the execution of the program; inherent limitations to 
the conception of productive projects; and opera-
tional challenges. (Cordeiro 2009: Executive Summary 
– author’s translation)
Some of the failures of PROCAMBIX can be associated 
with a lack of proper consideration of the traditional 
cultural aspects of the Xerente people. PROCAMBIX 
was designed by an external group of non-Indigenous 
consultants, and there was a lack of social scientists, par-
ticularly anthropologists. As a consequence, the program 
failed to consider crucial cultural aspects that negatively 
influenced the performance of the whole program. For 
example, one key aspect that was ignored was the exist-
ence of clan moieties and the associated tendency for 
factionalism, which are classic themes in the ethnology 
of Jê peoples (Fernandes 2012). The lack of adequate 
consideration of this issue led to many conflicts between 
the different groups and ultimately to a proliferation 
of the number of villages. This proliferation is related 
to the fact that each village had the right to receive 
certain compensation arrangements. In the development 
of the program, there should have been an awareness that 
rival groups would clash over the control of resources. An 
appropriate strategy would have been to engage with 
all local stakeholders in a manner that respects their tra-
ditional governance structures to find culturally appro-
priate solutions to avoid conflict between the factions.
Another issue was the lack of support for and align-
ment with traditional farming techniques. The promo-
tion of mechanized farming ultimately resulted in the 
abandonment of tractors due to the lack of resources 
for maintenance after the end of the program. Based on 
the interviews and document analysis, it appears that 
the proposed income generation and food sustainability 
activities seemed to have been considered only from a 
western perspective, with the Xerente traditional eco-
logical knowledge playing little role in the planning and 
implementation of the livelihood projects.
Gender issues were also not adequately considered, 
as was clearly identified in the final evaluation report 
(Cordeiro 2009, p. 128). This was evident in the compo-
sition of the steering committee, which comprised only 
male Indigenous representatives. Advocating for gender 
equality in many cross-cultural contexts is a complicated 
According to the Chief, a discussion about the Xerente 
which erupted at the national level caused major impacts 
to their self-identity, leading to apathy and despair, thus 
hindering the struggle for their rights. He cited a news 
report circulated widely on the internet, which was writ-
ten by an anthropologist who had conducted research 
with them over a long time period. The anthropologist 
(who was later expelled from the Brazilian Association of 
Anthropologists) blamed the Xerente for their own fate 
by arguing that many of the program’s beneficiaries had 
moved out of their villages to neighboring cities, leav-
ing the elderly and children behind in a precarious situ-
ation. Other anthropologists who had also worked with 
the Xerente promptly published a letter of repudiation 
(Giraldin et al. 2014). They stated that PROCAMBIX did not 
provide the Xerente with conditions necessary for their 
economic and cultural reproduction, and confirmed that 
the significant changes to the downstream water flow 
regime had impacted negatively on traditional riverside 
farming techniques and diminished fish and wildlife stocks.
NGOs stated in the interviews that INVESTCO and 
the federal government were using the program for 
greenwashing. They told us that PROCAMBIX was being 
presented to other communities (especially those in 
the middle of consultations for the construction of new 
dams) as being very successful and fair in its compensa-
tion to the Xerente people. In fact, this was the story we 
had originally heard about PROCAMBIX and that it was 
the benchmark of good practice. Our interviews with the 
Xerente who worked for the program indicated that they 
shared this same opinion during the execution of the 
program, however, in retrospect, they perceived many 
limitations and failures. Reflecting on the resources and 
efforts deployed, despite the unsatisfactory outcomes, a 
Xerente Elder who worked for the program stated: ‘it was 
like a hunt, we went with shotgun, machete, dog and all, 
but the game got away.’
Despite all its failures, some positive impacts were 
reported in interviews and in the final evaluation report 
(Cordeiro 2009). In particular, some interviewees men-
tioned that as a result of PROCAMBIX, the Indigenous 
organizations learned how to manage the bureaucracy, 
and their general ability to manage and implement 
projects increased. PROCAMBIX is still considered good 
practice in Brazil in the sense that it was the first attempt 
to implement a systematized program that went beyond 
a ‘wish list’ approach and actually implemented a broad, 
participative, and long-term program. An important suc-
cess factor for future compensation programs identified 
in interviews related to the need for engagement and 
goodwill of key people inside the institutions. Having a 
committed person inside the licensing authority who has 
had proper training, has sensitivity for dealing with social 
issues, and is willing to work hard to ensure that the best 
interests of the local communities are considered, makes 
an important difference to how processes are conducted 
and consequently on the final outcomes.
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where large amounts of money are often provided and 
spent without consideration given to local culture and 
practices. Because of the complexity of cross-cultural 
contexts, proper planning and implementation pro-
cesses to engage with Indigenous cultures takes more 
time and human resources than engagements with west-
ern communities (O’Faircheallaigh 2007).
Companies usually do not have the internal expertise 
on social development, making it necessary for them to 
hire consultants and sometimes use inexperienced inter-
nal staff to deal with the ‘social issues’ (Kemp & Owen 2013). 
Due to the lack of consideration of social issues, conflict 
with communities can occur and top-management will 
have to expend much more time and resources dealing 
with the so-called non-technical issues (Franks et al. 2014).
The strong alerts and red flags raised in the mid-term 
evaluation (de Paula 2003) apparently had little impact 
since most of the problems highlighted were also pres-
ent in the final evaluation report (Cordeiro 2009). In its 
contribution to the midterm evaluation, the Office of 
Public Prosecution stated that the program implemen-
tation seemed to be like a ‘runaway train,’ and recom-
mended that the pace of spending should be slowed 
down so that the term of expenditure could be doubled 
from 8 to 16 years (de Paula 2003, 2005). This suggestion 
was not taken up by the steering committee, possibly 
because, as some interviewees suggested, INVESTCO 
wanted to spend the agreed sum as soon as possible and 
‘get rid’ of its responsibility for the ‘Indigenous problem,’ 
thus fulfilling its legal obligations and enabling its staff 
to focus again on ‘core business’ (Kemp & Owen 2013). 
Because of all the concerns, the mid-term evaluation 
recommended that, if corrections to the program were 
not made, it ‘might be better just to divide the money 
among all [Indigenous] families’ (de Paula 2003, p. 24, 
author translation).
Given the scale of PROCAMBIX and the fact that it was 
one of the first structured compensation programs for 
Indigenous peoples in Brazil, it is surprising that most 
of the institutional memory about it has been lost or is 
inaccessible. During our visits to the licensing authority 
(Naturantins), when we asked for access to the docu-
mentation relating to the program and the EIA for the 
Lajeado Dam, we were informed that it was in the ‘sar-
cophagus’ – meaning the rarely accessed, ‘dead’ archives, 
characterized by dust and disorganization. This demon-
strates the lack of institutional capacity and inability for 
institutional memory and learning in many Brazilian 
governmental agencies, especially at the regional level. 
This is partly related to the high staff turnover, as was 
pointed out in some interviews. In Brazil and many other 
countries, a newly elected government might change 
the whole staff of regulatory agencies, leading to their 
lack of commitment to long-term planning. We note that 
into the future this archive issue might improve given 
the digital revolution, with most documents now being 
stored online.
issue because, for example, political decision-making 
has traditionally been considered a male forum in Jê 
peoples ethnology (Lea 2007). However, it could have 
been possible to make the range of productive activ-
ities more inclusive for women if they had have been 
involved in discussions about what was appropriate for 
them. According to the evaluation report, the lack of 
attention given to gender issues was a key factor in the 
lack of long-term achievements of the program.
Since the beginning of the licensing process for the 
Lajeado Dam, pressure from organized civil society 
groups was a positive force for improving the quality 
and scope of impact assessments and the mitigation 
and compensation measures. The beneficial results of 
political pressure have been observed elsewhere (Hanna 
et al. 2016a, 2016b). For example, at the Ekati mine in 
Canada, following substantial social pressure, an inde-
pendent watchdog was established to oversee the 
implementation of mitigation measures (Ross 2006). In 
the Lajeado Dam case, the First Seminar was a turning 
point in the way impacts were being considered. The 
First Seminar made it clear to the local population, the 
licensing authorities, and even INVESTCO, that impacts 
on the Xerente people should not be neglected. The 
Xerente and their non-Indigenous allies (NGOs, Public 
Prosecution) forced INVESTCO to conduct an impact 
assessment study specifically in relation to the impacts 
on the Indigenous land – which originally was not 
required ostensibly because the Xerente were located 
downstream. From the interviews, it becomes clear that 
the role of protest and NGO activism is absolutely neces-
sary to ensure Indigenous rights are respected and cul-
tural aspects are better considered in EIA (Hanna et al. 
2014, 2016a, 2016b).
The total value of the compensation package was the 
outcome of a conflictual negotiation process rather than 
a fiscal assessment of the costs of appropriate mitigation 
and/or compensation entitlement. The mother project 
suggested a compensation program amounting to R$14 
million. The final amount of R$10 million was determined 
by negotiation dynamics, not by technical analysis. 
Interviewees stated that the extra R$4 million may have 
made some difference to the final outcomes, possibly 
with long-lasting measures. We consider that the value 
of compensation programs should not be determined by 
negotiation, but by clear planning of the actions neces-
sary in order to mitigate or avoid the impacts on the local 
people and to provide reasonable benefits.
A problem with monetizing impacts is that money 
does not mitigate most impacts, and in fact, a large inflow 
of money can generate many more impacts (Vanclay 
2002; Vanclay et al. 2015), especially when Indigenous 
peoples are involved (Gordon 2010). Unfortunately, 
licensing authorities, entrepreneurs, and even impacted 
communities often have the view that throwing money 
at the community will fix all issues and impacts (Cernea 
2003; Esteves & Vanclay 2009). This leads to situations 
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impacted groups. FPIC is intended to imply an on-going 
process of meaningful engagement in which commu-
nities are continually involved in the decision-making 
processes that affect their lives, and not just as a once-
off consultation for project approval (Hanna & Vanclay 
2013).
It was clear in the interviews and literature review that 
the Xerente cosmology is reflected in their worldview, 
and in their perceptions about the dam, its impacts and 
the compensation program. The negative impacts of 
development and its non-Indigenous agents were com-
pared to jaguars who devour the natural environment 
and destroy the Indigenous cultures, while the positive 
impacts (the compensation plan and its resources) were 
compared to a ‘fat tapir’ to be feasted upon. However, the 
inadequacy of cultural understanding in the implemen-
tation of PROCAMBIX led to a lack of retention of benefits 
locally. Very few benefits or infrastructure from the pro-
ject remain, despite the expenditure of a considerable 
amount of money (the equivalent of about USD 5 mil-
lion). Thus, the whole process of project implementation 
was compared to a hunt that failed to capture the prey.
Conducting ethnographic fieldwork in itself will not 
necessarily ensure that the cultural aspects will be prop-
erly considered in project development. However, it can 
be a basis for fostering culturally appropriate engage-
ment processes between the different stakeholders. 
Anthropologists who have conducted extensive field-
work with the group in question and understand that 
group’s culture are likely to be able to act as an effective 
translator and mediator (Henriksen 2004). In the case 
of PROCAMBIX, if local people had have been properly 
engaged in the design and selection of the livelihood 
projects, the program would have been more likely to 
achieve sustainable outcomes.
Despite the regular steering committee meetings with 
some leaders representing the Xerente communities, 
there was not an appropriate process of participation at 
the village or household level. Each family should have 
been able to decide on the kinds of projects they wished 
to participate in. Difficulties in decision- making and 
reporting back to Indigenous communities have been 
encountered in the functioning of multi-stakeholder 
steering committees elsewhere (Ross 2006), demon-
strating that this is a common problem in cross-cultural 
EIA-follow-up. Improved cross-cultural governance 
arrangements that fully respect FPIC and the Indigenous 
right to self-determination should be put in place to ena-
ble equitable Indigenous participation.
The environmental licensing process in Brazil, and 
arguably almost everywhere, tends to ignore the cumula-
tive impacts of different projects in the same area. While 
impact assessments are required for each individual pro-
ject, there is little or no consideration of the impacts of 
projects on each other. Impacts influence each other, and 
in most cases are amplified (Vanclay 2002). Cumulative 
The position put in our interviews with representa-
tives of the Brazilian authorities was that INVESTCO had 
fulfilled its legal role in conducting the EIA and compen-
sation program according to the law, even though it was 
acknowledged that the mitigation strategies had largely 
failed. To some extent, this is also reflected in the judge’s 
decision on the class action filed by the Xerente against 
INVESTCO, in which the Xerente requested ongoing fund-
ing for the program. The judge argued that INVESTCO had 
fulfilled its obligation in mitigating the impacts by con-
ducting the agreed program and spending the agreed 
amount, regardless of the difficulties in implementation 
(Ação Civil Pública 2013). Thus, a legalistic approach 
seems to be dominant within government and INVESTCO.
7. Conclusion: making a case for considering 
the cultural dimensions
Based on our observations about the design and imple-
mentation of PROCAMBIX, some recommendations can 
be made that may assist future project developers, gov-
ernment institutions, NGOs, and Indigenous peoples fac-
ing project implementation. The first recommendation 
relates to a common problem in impact assessment, the 
excessive focus on the environment to the detriment of 
the social (Baines et al. 2013). This is evident in the pro-
gram’s name, the Xerente Environmental Compensation 
Program. It is also evident in the disciplinary background 
of the staff members who were engaged to design and 
implement the mitigation measures. Although some 
anthropologists and other social scientists were engaged 
at certain specific moments, the majority of the staff were 
environmental practitioners. Serious consideration of 
the social and cultural aspects of any project is strongly 
recommended. This would be enhanced by the use of 
ethnographic fieldwork, especially in situations where 
the communities are culturally differentiated. If cultural 
aspects are not considered, it is likely that the mitigation 
plans and compensation arrangements will create neg-
ative impacts instead of mitigating them.
Protest action played a key role in the environmen-
tal licensing process and the initiation of PROCAMBIX. 
Without this community mobilization, it is likely that no 
specific impact assessment addressing the impacts expe-
rienced by the Xerente would have been conducted. 
However, the Xerente are not as empowered in the 
national and international political spheres to the same 
extent other Amazonian Indigenous groups are (Conklin 
1997), therefore they did not have enough leverage to 
enforce the continuity of the program. This demonstrates 
how, despite the rise of robust EIA procedures in Brazil, 
culturally differentiated peoples are still left worse off 
when large projects affect their lives (Hanna et al. 2014; 
Zanotti 2015). This is especially the case because pro-
cesses do not fully respect the principle of FPIC, and 
consequently fail to consider the sociocultural aspects of 
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